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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the discussion on normative uni-
versals in theory and practice by debating the universality of migration and 
its consequences. For it is precisely the all-encompassing universal of mo-
bility which is causing some of the tensions in the world that need in-depth 
reflection. Some of these will form the focus of this paper.
We will mainly concentrate on three such moments, or tensions, which 
are related to the universality of mobility: First, we aim to describe the ten-
sion which emerges between migrants and nation-states and which calls for 
global cooperation and solutions; second, transnationalism, as an effect of 
mobility and globalisation, will be discussed and we shall show how the 
transnational practices of migrants clash with current political ideas about 
integration and the social cohesion of societies; finally, we turn to the ef-
fects of the circulation of one specific idea of culture, that is, the idea of a 
reified culture that migrants carry with them—this raises serious questions 
about the mechanisms of social exclusion and inclusion and gives the im-
pression that cultural conflicts are a universal destiny in the globalised 
world. The aim of this paper is, therefore, quite a modest one: to describe 
the tensions that emerge from the universality of mobility and to touch on 
some suggestions as to how to deal with them.
1. The universality of migration and mobility
The idea that the normal or natural condition of human beings is sedentari-
ness and immobility is accurate only when taking a very superficial view. 
If one looks closer, one easily detects that human beings have always been 
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mobile; we could say they have been wandering and moving all over the 
world looking for better living conditions since the beginning of humanity. 
Even in the ancient world, for example during Roman times, as well as in 
the era of the Vikings, during the crusades, colonisation, and the mass Eu-
ropean migration to North America in the 17th and 18th century, men and 
women have always been on the move. Some were escaping poverty or 
war, others looking for better lives, some were just greedy for adventure or 
wanted to discover new worlds. The American sociologist Robert E. Park, 
one of the first migration sociologists and a founder of the famous Chicago 
School, formulated at the beginning of the last century the hypothesis that 
evolution and progress in human history was (not only but) mainly caused 
by continuous migration movements and the incidental collision, conflicts 
and fusions of people and cultural systems which they occasion (Park 
1928). One can decide either to adopt this pro-migratory stance and univer-
sal attitude or to negate it: there is, however, no way to avoid recognising 
that since the end of World War II migration and mobility have increased 
considerably all over the world. The development of modern means of 
communication, as well as transport technologies and globalisation pro-
cesses have facilitated and enhanced mobility worldwide (Pennix et al. 
2006). At the present time, there is no region left in the world which is not 
affected by mobility, be it as a destination, transit country or country of 
origin. 
In 2005 there were nearly 200 million international migrants, counting 
only those who had lived outside their home country for more than a year 
and including 9.2 million refugees. This figure is—just to give a basis for 
comparison—equivalent to the population of the fifth largest country, Bra-
zil. In other words, 1 in 35 persons is an international migrant, or 3% of the 
world’s population; and half of these people are women (Global Commis-
sion on International Migration GCIM 2005). 
An analytical glance reveals that migration and mobility can take on dif-
ferent morphologies: There is the first type of migrant, in the well-known 
sense of Simmel’s (1992, p. 764) «stranger», «who comes today and stays 
tomorrow»1. We are thinking of the settled ‹guest workers› like the Italians 
in Switzerland, or more generally of all the migrants in the Fordist sense of 
the term who constitute the group of classical working migrants. However, 
we can also find other types of migrants who are not sedentary in the new 
host country—they are much more mobile and even circulate. The eco-
nomic and political transformations in the last decades, the weakening of 
the social state and globalisation processes in general have generated a new 
demand for workers in different economic sectors and new forms of mobil-
ity for women and men: the so-called «modern nomads», who do highly 
skilled work in IT or management and circulate globally from working 
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place to working place, are one example (Iredale 2001, Müller-Jentsch 
2008). The demand for a feminine workforce in specific service sectors, 
like in the household, in the care of the elderly and children, or in the sex 
industry (Agustin 2007), are other examples of newer forms of mobility. 
With the entry of women into the labour markets in industrialised coun-
tries, the need for female migrants who do the reproductive work previ-
ously done by native women induced mobility (Hochschild 1983, Sassen 
2003). These women often have families in their home countries and they 
are much less sedentarised than the traditional Fordist migrants. Finally, 
we find one type of mobility which is, by its nature, even farther away from 
the one-way migration which was typical of the classical working migrant, 
and that is durable circular mobility. In this case, mobility is not only a way 
of connecting a point of departure and a point of destination, but mobility 
is itself the strategy of these individuals. Instead of going away in order to 
establish themselves in another country, these migrants stay permanently 
mobile in order to improve or maintain their quality of life. Algerians who 
circulate between Algeria, France and Istanbul buying and selling their 
wares (Tarrius 1993, 2002) are an illustration of this type of mobile person. 
But the phenomenon of the so-called «commerce à la valise» (business out 
of a suitcase) involving women in different parts of the world can also be 
classified within this category. Commerce à la valise is an activity which 
fundamentally rests on the competence in mobility of those concerned who 
buy and sell their products on the road, as shown by Peraldi (2007) for 
Morocco and by Schmoll (2005) for Tunisian women. This practice of mo-
bility is also widespread among women from the former communist coun-
tries in Eastern Europe, where post-communist transformations have gen-
erated new migration processes (Morokvasic 2003). In order to escape the 
local economic conditions, many women, both qualified and unqualified, 
travel to countries in the European Union or the United States. They go for 
a weekend or from Monday to Friday in order to earn money through a 
whole range of different activities; they pendulate, and some of them go 
back to work in their regular jobs: some do business with pirate music re-
cordings; others work as domestic employees or just over the weekends as 
prostitutes. Cabaret dancers from Eastern European countries who work in 
Switzerland also partially correspond to this type of migrant (Dahinden/ 
Stants 2006). Some of them complete a real global parcours: they work in 
erotic night clubs in Japan, in Switzerland, and in the Lebanon and then 
they go back home on a regular basis in order to be with their families, to 
work in another job or to continue their studies. 
The purpose of this short introduction was to elaborate on the fact that 
today mobility is a universal (see also Urry 2007); it can adopt different 
morphologies and implicates highly skilled as well as lowly skilled people, 
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men as well as women; migration movements go from south to south, from 
north to north or from south to north. 
It is precisely this all-encompassing universal of mobility which is caus-
ing some of the tensions in the world that require in-depth reflection. This 
paper concentrates on three such moments, or tensions, which are related 
to the universality of mobility: First, the tension which emerges between 
migrants and nation-states and which calls for global cooperation and solu-
tions will be described; second, transnationalism, as an effect of mobility 
and globalisation, will be discussed and we shall show how the transna-
tional practices of migrants clash with current political ideas about integra-
tion and the social cohesion of societies; finally, we turn to the effects of 
the circulation of one specific idea about culture, that is, the idea of a re-
ified culture that migrants carry with them—this raises serious questions 
about the mechanisms of social exclusion and inclusion and gives the im-
pression that cultural conflicts are a universal destiny in the globalised 
world. The aim of this paper is, therefore, quite a modest one: to describe 
the tensions that emerge from the universality of mobility and to touch on 
some suggestions as to how to deal with them.
2. Tension one: Mobility and nation-states
Although different forms of mobility have been a universal since the begin-
ning of human history, the idea of controlling and managing this mobility 
is quite new. In other terms, even though migration is a structural element 
of human history, the control of migration has mainly occupied policy 
makers since the formation and establishment of the modern nation-state.
Ernest Gellner (1983) demonstrated how the congruence, nowadays 
considered natural, between national, territorial, political, economic and 
social boundaries actually emerged in the course of nationalism and nation-
building processes. For Gellner nationalism is primarily a political princi-
ple which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent, 
thus, having a nation with its people and culture is not an inherent attribute 
of humanity, but it has come to appear as such (Gellner 1983, p. 6). That is 
what Gellner called the premises of nationalism.
As the nationalist conception of people and society took hold during the 
nation-building process, the conception of migrants also began to change 
and free circulation was replaced by historically new forms of border con-
trol. With the creation of the modern nation-state and its ideas of belonging 
(naturally) to a specific ethnic or national group, access to its territory, to 
specific rights and certain services—which the modern welfare state is 
supposed to guarantee to its citizens—began to be regulated in a very spe-
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cific manner (Mackert 1999, Wimmer 2002). In this sense the formation of 
modern nation-states can be understood as a double process of closure: 
closure of the geographical domain by controlling borders and closure of 
the domain of membership through its codification. From then on, it be-
came necessary for a person to have a permit to enter and reside in a coun-
try, creating the distinction between nationals who did belong and ‹foreign-
ers› who did not.2 Wimmer and Schiller (2002) showed conclusively how, 
according to those premises of nationalism, immigrants appear to be anom-
alies, destroying the isomorphism between people, sovereign and citizenry, 
but also between people and nation and between people and solidarity 
group. Immigrants are an exception to the rule of sedentariness within the 
boundaries of nation-states (Wimmer/ Schiller 2002, pp. 309–310). It fol-
lows that living as foreigners among a ‹host nation› means not having the 
same rights as other citizens and being deprived of a set of specific re-
sources, both concrete and symbolic. This was the birth of migration con-
trol. Nation-states have the sovereignty to define which people are to be 
admitted into their territory, the states from which they can come and the 
rights they will receive. On the other side, a state also has the sovereignty 
to define which members of its national population may or may not leave 
its territory; it can try to regulate not only immigration but also emigration. 
For instance, emigration from Albania was forbidden during the whole 
communist period up to 1989. 
Likewise, Switzerland implemented a law controlling immigration and 
defining the rights of the ‹foreigners› in its territory for the first time in 
1931, thereby ending by law a phase of liberal circulation; liberal bilateral 
agreements were terminated as early as 1914. Since then, Switzerland has 
continually created new categories of immigrants with different rights 
through its ethno-national differentiation:3 for example, working migrants 
with residence permits or annual permits, or the category of asylum seekers 
known since 1979. In line with other European countries, from 1990 on-
wards Switzerland developed restrictive and defensive immigration poli-
cies to keep out migrants from outside the EU/EFTA. Today, people from 
outside Europe can no longer enter Switzerland legally unless they are 
highly qualified or have a right to family reunification (Efionayi-Mäder et 
al. 2003, Piguet 2005). 
The point is that these efforts by nation-states (or conglomerates of nation-
states as is the case with the EU) to control universal migration have 
 different effects, some of them desired, others unintended: it seems obvi-
ous that, with a spiralling pattern of new measures to restrict and control 
migration to Western European states, ‹innovative› forms of immigration, 
new actors and new dynamics will also develop. Tougher regulation has by 
definition led to more illegality and irregularity, creating fresh opportuni-
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ties for new actors like smugglers and traffickers. And we can also say that 
the new migration policy has created another important category of mi-
grants: the «Sans Papiers», as they are commonly called in Switzerland, or 
undocumented migrants, referring to migrants living and working in Swit-
zerland with no legal residence or work permits.4 Moreover, during the 
1990s, the phenomenon of undocumented migrants linked to human smug-
gling—defined here as the facilitation of illegal entry into states for prof-
it—gained a lot of attention in the international arena. Meanwhile, Euro-
pean states have accorded the fight against undocumented migrants and 
human smuggling highest priority. In the public debate there is widespread 
‹moral panic› linking smuggling to organised crime, as well as to threats to 
sovereignty, the internal security of states and to the exploitation of human 
beings, thus intensifying the picture of the ‹enemy immigrant›, which is 
based on the norms of nationalism. However, social scientists have found 
little evidence for the claims that organised crime is involved in smuggling 
(Laczko/ Klekowski von Koppenfeld 2000, Van Liempt/ Doomernik 2006). 
They suggest that many smuggling operations take place within the respec-
tive ethnic communities, families or groups of acquaintances. Based on 
interviews with Kosovo-Albanians, Iraqis and Sri Lankans in Switzerland, 
Efionayi-Mäder et al. (2001) showed that all of these people, who had re-
quested asylum in Switzerland in the 1990s, had been smuggled at some 
point along the trajectory that brought them to Switzerland, but most in 
quite an unorganised manner. This does not however detract from the fact 
that—as we can see almost every day on TV or in the newspapers—a lot of 
migrants lose their lives while trying to get to Europe. Furthermore, since 
9/11, mobility has been very closely related to the question of internal se-
curity, and terrorism has reinforced the picture of the threatening alien.5 
Obviously it will not be possible here to present solutions for overcom-
ing the tension resulting from the universal of migration, on the one hand, 
and the logic of nation-states and their efforts to cut back unwanted migra-
tion on the other. One could propose that we abolish the nation-state and 
seek other forms of political communities, but we are all aware that this 
would be just an intellectual exercise without further consequences—al-
though it could be an interesting one. We could also suggest that we return 
to the meaning of nation as a political community not associated with eth-
nicity, as postulated by Tourraine (1997).
However, on a more practical level, today many people realise that this 
tension has high costs: on the one hand, the cost to the nation-states of es-
tablishing high security controls on their borders with all related issues, 
and on the other hand, the human cost on the side of the migrants. The fact 
that migration nowadays has a global character brings various consequenc-
es with it: one is that it seems difficult, if not impossible, for each nation-
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state to control migration on its own. Migration, and this is emphasized by 
most specialists in this domain, is a phenomenon that needs global and in-
terstate cooperation in order to avoid the costs which are the result of the 
restrictive immigrant policies described above (Aleinikoff 2002, GCIM 
2005). Meanwhile, there have been some initiatives aiming at cooperation 
on this issue—the «Berner Initiative» or the recommendation of the Global 
Commission for Migration which emphasises interstate cooperation and 
collaboration are examples. Nation-states are as universal as migration and 
mobility; in the course of globalisation processes, the emergence of inter-
national political structures (EU, WHO, etc.) and the growing codification 
of a human rights regime, nation-states may have lost sovereignty and 
power with regard to their ability to regulate economic and other dimen-
sions, as postulated by some authors (for instance Sassen 1996). However, 
when it comes to migration and its control, nation-states are not outdated, 
neither have they lost their power, so we cannot confirm this ‹post-nation-
alist› hypothesis. But we may have to think about new forms of the state 
and of possible interstate cooperation between the countries of immigra-
tion and emigration. We are therefore still left with the following questions: 
Can we globally establish a migration system respecting universal values 
and, if so, which values? Can we introduce universal and democratic val-
ues into the migration regimes of the industrialised countries?
3. Tension two: Transnationalism and the logic of nation-states
One of the side effects of migration and mobility is the development of 
transnationalism and transnational practices by the people on the move. 
Transnational migrant practices again challenge the logic of nation-states 
but in yet another way, which will be shown in the following.
More than a decade has passed since the idea of «transnationalism» was 
introduced into academic discourse. Nina Glick Schiller and her colleagues 
(Schiller et al. 1995) apparently had a finger on the ‹Zeitgeist›, as this con-
cept has evolved into one of the most popular among migration scholars. 
From then on, this new perspective on migration phenomena put the accent 
on how migrant networks were constructed and reconstructed in various 
societies and on the way in which transnational spaces evolve—as the no-
tion implies—crossing national boundaries. Generally speaking, the idea 
of transnationalism emerged from the realisation that immigrants maintain 
ties with their countries of origin, making home and host society a single 
arena for social action by moving back and forth across international bor-
ders, as well as between different cultures and social systems, and by ex-
ploiting transnational relations as a form of social capital for their living 
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strategies (Vertovec 1999). One group of case studies showed how new 
interdependencies are built up in the migration process and how migrants 
are involved in creative social, economic and political activities in transna-
tional fields all over the world (Levitt/ Jaworsky 2007, Pries 1997). Mi-
grants send remittances and financially support their family and friends 
living in their home country (or in third countries). They might be involved 
in transnational business (Guarnizo 2003), or be politically engaged simul-
taneously in both their host country and in their country of origin (Oster-
gaard-Nielsen 2003). Last but not least, they maintain social relations with 
their friends and families at home (Dahinden 2005a).6
In this way, migrants can identify with more than one nation-state, but 
sometimes, if they come from nationalised states, their loyalty might re-
main with the state of origin—this is the point where the tension arises: 
Civil societies in both the emigration and immigration countries raise ques-
tions regarding the allegiance and political bona fides of people whose so-
cial identities are largely framed by their connections to the state. From the 
standpoint of the receiving states, international migrants are aliens, not just 
strangers. This view was incorporated into the first, classical integration or 
assimilation theory developed in the US and imported (with some adapta-
tions) into the European context. Since 1920 the assimilation of migrants 
has been understood as a process which will result in complete assimilation 
and complete identification of the migrants with the host society (Gordon 
1964, Park et al. 1967 [1925]). Only this outcome—so the hypothesis—
will guarantee social cohesion: This is because a common reservoir of 
norms and representations is a condition of social cohesion. During this 
process migrants pass from ‹aliens› to nationals. However, in the middle of 
the last century, the scientific and political agenda changed fundamentally 
with regard to conceptions of assimilation: During the 1960s in the course 
of the so-called «ethnic revival» (Glazer/ Moynihan 1963), the ground was 
prepared for the politics of multiculturalism and cultural pluralism, as well 
as affirmative action and equal opportunities. A «differentialist turn», as 
Brubaker (2001) called the phenomenon, was the result. Particularistic eth-
nic and cultural identities became the basis for identity politics and were 
now evaluated as being important for integration—they were no longer 
seen as an obstacle to assimilation into the host country or its ‹core soci-
ety›.7 At present we are entering the third phase of these debates, a phase 
which is characterised by a kind of ‹backlash› against excessive diversity 
caused by multiculturalism (Grillo 2007). In different countries the debate 
in politics and the public arena is centring on the question of whether our 
societies have become too diverse and heterogeneous, even in the scien-
tific literature this question is more and more prominent. Following this 
line of reasoning, Putnam (2007) showed that too much ethnic diversity 
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leads to less social capital in societies. It does not come as a surprise, there-
fore, that we are witnessing, on the one hand, the return of classical as-
similation theories—they are now labelled neo-assimilationist theories 
(Alba/ Nee 1997, Brubaker 2001)—and a new interest in assimilation poli-
tics in the public and political arenas on the other hand. 
It might be interesting to know that, historically, assimilation efforts 
were always strongest in times of war, as the non-loyalty of immigrants 
towards their host state could be a serious danger to internal security in 
such situations—for instance, during the First World War great efforts were 
made to Americanise Germans living in the United States and even to force 
them to assimilate (Waldinger/ Fitzgerald 2004). 
Nowadays the world is not at war in that way, but still these kinds of neo-
assimilation efforts are growing and voices against diversity are gaining 
ground: One hypothesis which could be put forward is that the increasing 
assimilation efforts are closely linked to the ‹war against terrorism and 
mobility›. The London bombing, for instance, brought up the problem of 
the non-loyalty of even nationals and the detention of a terrorist with the 
name of Fritz in Germany showed this problem in all its acridity. Another 
hypothesis is that the formation of nation-states has entered a new phase 
demanding even more identification than ever. The idea of the adaptation 
of migrants to ‹Swiss›, ‹German› or ‹French› norms and values is in de-
mand, while at the same time pluralism is becoming a central feature in 
these societies. Politicians have put this idea into practice, for example, in 
Germany with new naturalisation tests. Baden-Wurttemberg and Hessen 
have introduced questionnaires, where norms and cultural values are ex-
amined and the fidelity of the candidate towards democracy and his or her 
general loyalty towards the German state is tested. In France, migrants 
have to sign a contract of integration. The signature on this contract is in-
tended to show both their willingness to engage positively in the integra-
tion process and their loyalty towards the fundamental principles of French 
society. In Switzerland, newly arrived migrants in various cantons will 
soon have to sign a contract where they confirm that they will adhere to 
Swiss norms and values. 
In brief, we are witnessing, on the one hand, growing transnational (and 
border-crossing) practices with the involvement of migrants. On the other 
hand, the logic of the nation-state clearly puts them under pressure to ac-
cept a single identification and to engage in nationalised identity politics in 
the new country or the country of origin. The universal of the logic of nation-
states and the universal of the transnational practices of migrants dem-
onstrate here yet again the tensions and contradictions. This tension raises 
different questions: Is the social cohesion of societies possible only under 
conditions of unique and single-nation identities as classical sociology 
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claimed? How should we deal with these new forms of pluralism in a na-
tion-state? Do we need to find—in our current pluralistic and diversified 
societies—new ways of binding societies together and of creating a ‹we›?
4. Tension three: The globalisation of the idea of a reified culture—or 
the illusion of culture as destiny
The last point we would like to raise is closely related to the previous ones, 
but highlights another dimension, a dimension commonly called ‹culture›. 
With regard to mobility, one can see that not only do humans circulate, but 
so do cultural meanings: transmitted by migrants or through the diversified 
channels of information technologies, cultural meanings travel around the 
globe. What is the outcome of this enhanced diffusion of cultural meanings 
around the world? While some predict that in future we shall have to deal 
with one single homogeneous culture dispersed all over the globe—with 
McDonaldisation as its symbol—others predict that we shall have to face 
cultural demarcation and reinforced cultural identities. Following this line 
of thought, some postulate that mobility will result in cultural conflicts, and 
that these will be ineluctable.
At the present time we find two ideal-typical, and fundamentally differ-
ent, ideas about ‹culture›; one idea is widespread in scientific publications, 
the other in the public and political spheres. The first type of idea we will 
call the «figure of creativity», the second the «figure of stability» (see also 
Dahinden 2005b).8 
Let us start with the scientific idea of culture. Here, the global wandering 
of cultural meanings with migrants, or through information channels, is 
seen as having the effect of multiplying cultural systems. Culture is seen as 
creative—new cultural products like ‹ethnomusic› emerge when the local 
and global contents of cultural meanings encounter each other. In the last 
decades, new concepts have been developed to help define the new modi, 
the conditions of ‹culture› production and cultural transformations. We 
speak of hybridisation, of cultural métissage or of creolisation (Hylland 
Eriksen 2003, Werbner 1997, Hannerz 1992, 1996).9 When different cul-
tural meanings meet, new cultural forms are created from these meanings 
and the cultural meanings are (locally) recontextualised. In this sense, hu-
man beings have to be understood as ‹bricoleurs›. If a play by Shakespeare 
is performed in Burkina Faso by local actors, then it no longer belongs to 
England, but it is globalised in order to be ‹localised›, or adapted locally. 
The old meanings have now, without doubt, been modified. The ideas 
which perceive of culture as a creative process performed by human beings 
in specific local contexts and involving specific power relations we shall 
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call the «figure of creativity». But this is only half of the story: Such dy-
namic ideas about culture and the ability of actors to make sense of their 
environment clash today with ideas about culture which insist on its stabil-
ity and immutability. In the latter, ideal-type culture is linked to a given 
territory (the culture of the Swiss is in Switzerland, the culture of the Serbs 
is in Serbia, and so on). Culture is not only seen as being linked to a certain 
territory, but if one leaves the territory of one’s culture, it is as if this culture 
necessarily accompanies you, as a piece of luggage one cannot abandon 
and which determines what one is able to do in other places.
For most Swiss citizens it may be obvious that ‹the Swiss› are far from 
being a homogeneous group with an overarching collective culture; in fact, 
they are plural and diverse on various levels. But immigrants and ethnic or 
national groups are seen as invariable and it is taken for granted that im-
migrant groups are constituted along ethnic and cultural lines; thus the 
habit of referring to such groups as the Turks, Yugos or Albanians, as if 
they were homogeneous and clearly circumscribed, and as if their members 
formed a unitary and collective group, with a common purpose and a com-
mon culture. In this kind of thinking, we find a phenomenon for which 
Brubaker (2004, p. 35) coined the word «groupism»: the tendency to take 
discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous, and externally 
bounded groups as the basic constituents of social life to which interests 
and agency can be attributed. It even seems, speaking in a slightly ironic 
way, that these ethnic or national groups are a kind of extended arm of their 
‹natural› (territorially defined), ethnic or national origins. In this way, cul-
tural groups or communities are transformed into transnational cultural 
groups (Dahinden 2008). Culture in this figure is something immutable and 
untouched by societal factors—like power, for instance. 
Interestingly enough, this idea of a reified and naturalised culture some-
times has positive associations, sometimes negative ones. In multicultural-
ism and identity politics, as described before, they are positive—maintain-
ing that diversity is positive, as well as important, for human beings and 
that one has the right to be culturally different. 
On the other side, there are negative connotations and it is postulated 
that the future of the world depends on culture. The most prominent repre-
sentative of this orientation is still Samuel Huntington (1993) with his 
apocalyptical vision of the clash of civilisations. In other words, conflicts 
between different cultures—as the most important dimension of identities 
are immutable—are the logical consequence of migration and globalisa-
tion.
The other idea, culture as the «figure of creativity», maintains that cul-
ture is the acquisition in the course of life of specific dispositions which 
allow agency and make sense of the world. Culture is an open process 
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which has to be analysed (Wicker 1997). In the second figure, culture is 
bound, directly related to the ‹nation-territory-people-culture› axes, and 
stoical; and culture becomes the source of explanations for behaviour, for 
instance. Culture does not have to be described and analysed but ‹to have a 
culture› is always to ‹be cultural› and never, as in the first figure, ‹to make 
culture›. In this sense, everybody knows, for instance, quite mystically, 
what Albanian culture is. 
In the last 10 years, social scientists have produced a flood of articles and 
books to show that the second figure of culture makes no sense from a 
scientific point of view, and they have formulated a long list of serious 
critiques, which will not be repeated here. Let us simply reiterate that the 
‹culture-as-stability› idea corresponds to the classical perception of the no-
tion in question, as developed in American social anthropology, and is 
closely related to the philosophical (and nationalist) ideas of Johann Gott-
fried Herder (for critique see Wimmer 2005). But this classical notion has 
taken on a life of its own; politicians and journalists, as well as the migrants 
themselves and other actors, use this notion in order to describe feelings, 
belongings, behaviour and other people.
One of the main problems arising from this idea of culture is that it feeds 
the illusion of destiny (Sen 2006)—individuals in a specific cultural group 
have a specific way of thinking and behaving which is immutable. Amartya 
Sen criticises strongly what he labels a «solitarist approach» to human 
identity, which means seeing the human being as a member of precisely 
one group without the ability to choose in certain situations between the 
different aspects of his or her multiple identities. In our normal lives, as 
Sen insists, human beings see themselves as members of a variety of 
groups—and they belong to all of them. The same person can be, without 
any contradiction, «an American citizen, of Caribbean origin, with African 
ancestry, a Christian, a liberal, a woman, a vegetarian, a long-distance run-
ner, an historian, a schoolteacher, a novelist, a feminist, a heterosexual, a 
believer in gay and lesbian rights, a theatre lover, an environmental activ-
ist, a tennis fan, a jazz musician, and someone who is deeply committed to 
the view that there are intelligent beings in outer space with whom it is 
extremely urgent to talk (preferably in English)» (Sen 2006, p. xiii). 
Furthermore, culture as an idea of stability can very easily become a 
means of social exclusion, because it is only a short distance between in-
surmountable difference and the hierarchising of this difference: all of a 
sudden, certain cultures are superior to others, and cultural conflicts will 
never be solved because they are destiny. 
In other words, it seems as if we have to deal with the mechanism of 
cultural demarcation and reinforced cultural identities in this globally in-
terconnected world. Interestingly enough, on the other side, political de-
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mands are also increasingly being formulated in ‹culturalised language›: 
The demand is for the recognition of cultural differences and no longer for 
socioeconomic redistribution (Fraser/ Honneth 2003). 
In short, particularism, and not universality, is at stake when debating 
culture. However, this has not always been the case. In the French tradition, 
it was the universal character of culture which was emphasised: culture as 
the capacity of human beings to make sense of and give meaning to the 
world, to form a civilisation and make use of the potential for rational 
thinking (Cuche 2004 [2001, 1996]). How can we reconcile the idea of 
recognising particular identities with the universal ideas of the French? Or 
how can we arrive at a more universal understanding of culture in order to 
avoid simplistic ideas about destiny, and profit from the agency human be-
ings have in creating culture?
5. Conclusion
The face of the world has changed during the last decades. Mobility has 
been one of the strongest forces in these transformation processes and has 
to be considered as a practice with universal character. However, this uni-
versal contradicts other universals, such as for instance the logic of nation-
states. Mobility clashes with the efforts of nation-states to keep unwanted 
persons away; mobility results in transnational practices and identities 
which clash with the neo-assimilation efforts of nationalising states. And 
last but not least, mobility is related to the dissemination of a specific idea 
of culture. According to this idea, it would appear that culture is destiny 
and that cultural clashes are the normal outcome of mobility. 
These three contradictions are all interwoven with processes of social 
exclusion; that is why we decided to call them ‹tensions›. A large propor-
tion of the people involved in mobility are not wanted by Western nation-
states and their policies aim at excluding them—having the wrong ‹culture› 
or ‹national background› results in exclusion with strong pressure to as-
similate, or in stigmatisation and discrimination. 
Clearly there are no simple solutions to these contradictions and these 
tensions will not be overcome easily. However, it is important that the de-
bate about universality in theory and practice take into account the ideas 
and problems discussed here. Only globalised democratic universal val-
ues—which highlight and counteract unequal power relationships—can 
take us in the right direction. 
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* I would like to thank the organisers and the participants of the SAHS Colloquium «Uni-
versality: From Theory to Practice» for their feedback on the paper I presented. Special 
thanks go to Etienne Piguet whose interesting comments without doubt contributed to 
improving this text. Finally, thanks to Rachel Matthey for editing the English manu-
script.
1 Emphasis G.S., translation J.D.
2 The idea that the world is naturally divided into nation-states and that these states are the 
appropriate units for analysis has the effect of blinding not only politicians but also re-
searchers. The concept of «methodological nationalism» has been put forward in order to 
describe this weakness within social science: The critique refers to the unquestioned trans-
fer of boundaries, categories and variables of the national view into the scientific perspec-
tive, and to the excessive weight of the nation-state as a category of reference, even among 
social scientists (Beck 2002, pp. 84–94). Methodological nationalism has in this line of 
argument been defined by Wimmer/ Schiller 2002, p. 302, as «the assumption that the 
nation/ state/ society is the natural social and political form of the modern world».
3 It is evident that considerations other than nationality influence the Swiss migration policy 
as well, such as political considerations for instance, or more recently, the qualification of 
migrants.
4 Irregular migration is a complex and diverse concept that requires careful clarification, 
which cannot be provided here. It is important to recognise that there are a variety of 
routes to irregularity: Irregular migration includes people who enter a country without the 
proper authority (for example through clandestine entry and entry with fraudulent docu-
ments); people who remain in a country in contravention of authority (for example by 
staying after the expiry of a visa or work permit, through sham marriages or fake adop-
tions, as bogus students or fraudulently self-employed); or people moved by migrant 
smugglers or human traffickers (Efionayi-Mäder/ Cattacin 2002, Koser 2005). There were 
«Sans Papiers» in Switzerland as early as the 1970s; however, with an increasingly restric-
tive policy, this phenomenon has grown considerably.
5 In order to discuss this topic in detail, a separate article would be required.
6 There is another form of transnationalism which was not developed by sedentarised mi-
grants as discussed here in the text. The other form of transnationalism develops its theo-
retical ideas from concepts like circulatory migration and migrants’ knowledge of ‹how to 
keep on the move›. The central element is that mobility as such has become an integral 
part of the migrants’ strategy. Instead of migrating with the aim of settling in another 
country, these migrants tend to stay mobile in order to maintain or improve their quality of 
life—and in order to avoid having to emigrate. Alain Tarrius (2002), for example, speaks 
of the new nomads who, by creating circular territories between Alger, Marseille and 
Brussels, can at one and the same time belong here and there, there and here. They con-
tribute to a very thriving economic exchange in a transnational space involving a wide 
variety of goods, notably household electrical appliances and electronic equipment. They 
are not ‹diasporic› entrepreneurs in the sense of the first form of transnationalism, but 
nomadic entrepreneurs who develop a transnational orientation.
7 The emergence of particularism was not only observed with regard to ethnicity and cul-
ture, but also in relation to most of the other categories which from then on served as a 
basis for identity politics.
8 It is obvious that between these ideal-types lies a continuum and that they should in no 
way be understood as single types. For instance, cultural concepts developed on the basis 
of the habitus theory of Pierre Bourdieu relate the two types discussed here. 
9 It speaks for itself that processes of creolisation are not new, but that culture is always the 
result of something already existing, which has been transformed and creolized before. 
There is no such thing as a ‹real› or ‹authentic› culture.
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